We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve a market with a fuel-e¢ cient automobile under a scrappage program by the government. The program awards a subsidy to each consumer who trades in his or her used automobile with a new fuel-e¢ cient automobile, if the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) for the new one does not exceed a cuto¤ level. We derive the conditions assuring that the manufacturer has an incentive to qualify for the program, and …nd that when the cuto¤ level is low, the manufacturer may be unwilling to qualify for the program even if the subsidy is high. We also show that when the manufacturer quali…es for the program, increasing the MSRP cuto¤ level would raise the manufacturer's expected pro…t but may decrease the expected sales. A moderate cuto¤ level can maximize the e¤ectiveness of the program in stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles, whereas a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level can result in the largest pro…t for the manufacturer. The retailer's pro…t always increases when the manufacturer chooses to qualify for the program. Furthermore, we compute the government's optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy for a given sales target, and …nd that as the program budget increases, the government should raise the subsidy but reduce the MSRP cuto¤ level to maximize sales.
Introduction
In recent years many scrappage programs have been implemented to encourage the trade-in of old automobiles with more fuel-e¢ cient new automobiles. Such programs generally have 1 The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for a number of insightful comments that helped improve this paper.
2 Corresponding author: (lipingliang@ln.edu.hk; Tel: +852 2616-8103; Fax: +852 2892-2442).
the dual aim of stimulating the automobile market and removing ine¢ cient, high-emission automobiles from the road for the purpose of environmental protection. Even though some governments introduced similar programs (e.g., tax rebate programs) in the 1990s, the scrappage program was widely adopted in a number of countries only during the global recession that began in 2008. This happened because the 2008 …nancial storm heavily in ‡uenced the world-wide automobile sector, resulting in an unprecedented automobile industry crisis.
In Table 1 , we provide a summary of automobile scrappage programs that have been implemented by the governments of eight countries or regions in Asia, Europe, and North America. Under a scrappage program for automobile, a contingent subsidy is provided to each consumer who trades in his or her old vehicle for a new, more fuel-e¢ cient one that has a combined fuel economy.
Country /Region
Scrappage Program for Automobile Trade-In
China
The government provided each consumer with a subsidy of RMB3,000-RMB6,000 for trading in (Chinaautoweb.Com, 2010) a used, heavy polluting car or truck with a new one since June 2009, and later increased the subsidy to RMB5,000-RMB18,000 in order to implement the program more e¤ectively.
France
Each consumer can claim a e1,000 subsidy from the government if he or she trades in a used (IHS Global Insight, 2010) car that is more than 10 years old with a new car that meets Euro IV emission standards.
Germany
The government o¤ers a e2,500 subsidy (with a total subsidy value of e1.5 billion) to consumers (IHS Global Insight, 2010) who trade in their old vehicles for new ones that have low carbon dioxide emissions.
Greece
The government o¤ers the subsidy of e1,900-e4,200 to each buyer who trades in his or her (IHS Global Insight, 2010) old car with a new one that has ecological credentials. Japan
The government provides a subsidy of JPY250,000 for the trade-in of each vehicle …rst (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009) registered 13 years ago or earlier with a new model compliant with 2010 fuel e¢ ciency standards.
Mexico
The federal government provides a 15,000 pesos subsidy to each consumer who replaces his (Niedermeyer, 2009) or her vehicle that is at least 10 years old with a new, fuel-e¢ cient one, if the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) for the new vehicle is less than or equal to 160,000 pesos.
Slovaks
The government provides a e1,000 state subsidy to each buyer who replaces a car that is more (IHS Global Insight, 2010) than 10 years old with a new one, if the MSRP for the new car is not greater than e25,000.
The United States
The U.S. president recently signed the "Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save" (CARS) act. (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009) Under this act, if the MSRP for a new automobile is not greater than US$45,000, then the government rewards each consumer with a subsidy of US$3,500 or US$4,500, which depends on the types of both the new and the old automobiles. Table 1 : A summary of scrappage programs that have been implemented by the governments of eight countries or regions in Asia, Europe, and North America.
Some governments (e.g., Hong Kong, the United States, etc.) have reported that the scrappage program is useful for stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient vehicles. For example, the Environmental Protection Department of Hong Kong prepared HK$3.2 billion for its scrappage program, and announced that this amount had been committed within 18 months. As reported by Yacobucci and Canis (2009) , the United States appropriated an initial amount of $1 billion for its "Car Allowance Rebate System" (CARS) program to support qualifying transactions. Immediately after the …rst week of implementing the CARS program, the United States's Department of Transportation announced that this program was embraced by thousands of consumers and by automobile retailers across the country, and nearly all of the funds appropriated for the CARS program were committed. In a response to the high demand resulting from the CARS program, the House of Representatives decided to make available an additional $2 billion to extend the program. In Slovaks, 62.3% of the total sales realized between March and December 2009 were attributed to the government's scrappage program; see the IHS Global Insight (2010).
From our above discussion, we …nd that the scrappage program can be e¤ective in stimulating sales for fuel-e¢ cient automobiles during the economic recession. Hence, it would be important, and interesting, to consider the following relevant questions. First, we need to investigate if the manufacturer's and the retailer's pro…ts when the manufacturer quali…es for the scrappage program are higher than those when the manufacturer does not qualify. We note that the government's target of implementing the scrappage program is to boost the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles for the purpose of reducing harmful emissions and protecting the environment. Accordingly, we examine the conditions under which the program can e¤ectively stimulate the sales. We …nd from Table 1 that some governments (e.g., Mexico, Slovaks, and the United States) provide their subsidies only to the buyers who purchase new cars each with a manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) no more than a pre-determined cuto¤ level, whereas other governments (e.g., China, France, Germany, and Japan) do not set any MSRP cuto¤ level for their scrappage programs. It thus behooves us to investigate the impact of the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy amount on the automobile sales. To address our above questions in a general setting, we assume in this paper that the scrappage program for automobile trade-in involves a cuto¤ level and a subsidy.
We consider a two-echelon supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve consumers with a fuel-e¢ cient automobile under a government's scrappage program. The manufacturer makes a wholesale pricing decision and, as in the real-world automobile industry (see, e.g., Leaseguide.com 2011), determines an MSRP as a markup above the wholesale price. In accordance with the practice, the MSRP can be calculated as the manufacturer's wholesale price plus a markup percentage of the wholesale price. The markup percentage for an automobile uniquely corresponds to a gross pro…t margin, which, in the past two decades, was usually between 4% and 13% with an average value in the range [6%; 8%], as indicated at Leaseguide.com (2011) .
The retailer purchases the manufacturer's automobiles at the wholesale price, and then serves heterogenous consumers in a market of a …nite size. That is, there are a certain, …nite number of consumers each having a net valuation which is the consumer's valuation of a new, fuel-e¢ cient automobile minus the valuation of his or her old automobile. To re ‡ect the heterogeneity, we characterize the consumers'net valuations by a non-negative, …nite-valued random variable. As in practice, the retail price for each consumer is determined as a discount of the MSRP, which results from the negotiation between the consumer and the retailer. Accordingly, we analyze the bargaining process to determine the discount of the MSRP and calculate the retail price for each consumer. Since the retailer and the consumer may have di¤erent bargaining powers, we apply the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme-which was developed by Roth (1979) -to analyze the two-player cooperative game and …nd a unique MSRP discount, which determines the retail price charged to the consumer. For a recent application of GNB in supply chain analysis, see Huang et al. (2013) , who performed a numerical study to analyze automobile supply chains under a subsidy scheme, and Luo et al. (2014) , who analytically investigated a price-discount scheme for an automobile supply chain.
We then use the negotiated retail prices to develop the manufacturer's pro…t function, and maximize it to …nd the manufacturer's unique optimal wholesale price under a scrappage program. We derive the condition under which the manufacturer can bene…t from the program and is thus willing to set an MSRP lower than or equal to the cuto¤ level and qualify for the program. In addition, we show that, when the manufacturer quali…es for the scrappage program, raising the MSRP cuto¤ level will result in an increase in the manufacturer's expected pro…t but a decrease in the expected sales. Therefore, if the government intends to increase the expected sales for the fuel-e¢ cient automobile, then it should set a moderate value for the MSRP cuto¤ level. In addition, we …nd that a small subsidy may be ine¤ective in stimulating the sales. The government's optimal subsidy is increasing in its budget, while its optimal MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in the budget.
Literature Review
This paper is related to two streams of literature. The …rst stream explores the trade-in subsidies provided by …rms. For example, Levinthal and Purohit (1989) investigated a …rm's trade-in scheme for its durable products, and showed that the …rm can utilize trade-in rebates to promote an improved product generation by deterring the secondary market. For the trade-in problem by Levinthal and Purohit (1989) , van Ackere and Reynolds (1995) found that trade-in rebates can encourage consumers to trade in their used products for new ones. Fudenburg and Tirole (1998) considered the optimal pricing and trade-in rebate decisions for a …rm selling its products in a market that involves potential trade-in consumers-who intend to trade in used products for new ones-and potential …rst-time buyers-who may directly purchase the new products from the …rm. Ray et al. (2005) also studied the optimal pricing and trade-in strategies for a …rm that satis…es an age-dependent demand with durable and remanufactured products. Bruce et al. (2006) investigated a trade-in problem, and derived the conditions under which the manufacturer of a durable product is willing to o¤er a cash rebate to each consumer who trades in the used product for a new one. Using prospect theory, Kim et al. (2011) developed an analytical model to explore consumers'choices in their tradeins. Moreover, some researchers addressed the trade-in issues for general durable goods; see Clerides and Hadjiyiannis (2008) , Prince (2009), and Rao et al. (2009) .
Our paper di¤ers from this stream of research in that we contribute to the literature by …nding (i) the consumers'purchase decisions and the expected sales, (ii) the negotiated retail price, (iii) the optimal wholesale price, and (iv) the government's optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales. We can …nd the di¤erences from both managerial and technical perspectives. From the managerial perspective, the trade-in policy implemented by a government primarily aims at stimulating the sales of new fuel-e¢ cient automobiles to reduce CO 2 emissions, whereas the trade-in policy implemented by a …rm mainly aims at increasing the …rm's pro…t. A policy that e¤ectively increases a …rm's pro…t may not be e¤ective in increasing the sales. From the technical perspective, the …rm with its trade-in policy needs to make optimal decisions on price, subsidy, and other policy-related variables. However, when the trade-in subsidy is provided by a government, the …rm only makes its optimal pricing decision in response to the government's scrappage program, for which the government decides on its optimal cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales.
The second stream of literature is concerned with the scrappage programs (colloquially known as "cash for clunkers") implemented by governments, under which a subsidy is o¤ered to each consumer who trades in a used automobile for a new one. A number of researchers investigated the environmental and economic consequences of such scrappage programs. For a comprehensive review on the environmental impact of the scrappage programs, see Wee et al. (2011) . Some researchers examined the environmental impact of the scrappage programs from the empirical perspective. For instance, by measuring the e¢ ciency of the program in terms of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, Morrison et al. (2010) and Zolnik (2012) examined the costs generated by the program. Ryan (2012) estimated the e¢ ciency of the scrappage program in pollution reduction. As an alternative to the subsidy, governments may apply tax policies to in ‡uence consumers'trading-in behaviors. Fosgerau and Jensen (2013) considered the e¤ects of the government's tax reform on CO 2 emissions and social welfare. Brand et al. (2013) and Fullerton and West (2010) considered the combinations of tax and subsidy for the control of car pollution.
Besides the above empirical studies, researchers examined the environmental e¤ects of the scrappage program using various analytical models, which include the discrete analysis (e.g., Adda and Cooper, 2000) , mass point duration model (e.g., Chen and Niemeier, 2005) , integer program model (e.g., Gao and Stasko, 2009) , cost-bene…t analysis (e.g., Lavee and Becker, 2009) , life cycle optimization model (e.g., Kim et al. 2003 , Kim et al. 2004 , Spitzley et al. 2005 , Lenski et al. 2010 , and Basbagill et al. 2013 , and others (e.g., Chen et al. 2010 and Lorentziadis and Vournas 2011) .
Researchers also analytically investigated the economic impact of the scrappage program. For example, Hahn (1995) assessed the likely bene…ts and costs of the scrappage program, and Alberini et al. (1995) modeled the owner's car tenure and scrappage decision, and forecasted the participation rates in the scrappage program. Incorporating the scrappage cycle length, de Palma and Kilani (2008) presented an economic model to assess the impact of scrap value for old cars and taxes on gasoline. By maximizing the social net bene…t, Iwata and Arimura (2009) analyzed the optimal retirement timing of the Japanese program for air pollution regulation. Licanaro and Sampayo (2006) designed a model to quantitatively evaluate Spain's 1997 scrappage program.
In addition, researchers examined the economic e¤ects using the empirical data in some speci…c programs. Several studies recently investigated the impact of the U.S. 2009 automobile CARS program (see, Yacobucci and Canis 2009 , Busse et al. 2012 , Mian and Su… 2012 , Copeland and Kahn 2013 , Klier and Rubenstein 2013 , and Li and Wei 2013 . A recent report by IHS Global Insight (2010) assessed the economic, environmental, and safety impact of the scrappage program implemented by countries in European Union. Aldred and Tepe (2011) considered the scrappage programs in Germany and the UK. Huse and Lucinda (2013) investigated the e¤ects of the Swedish "green car rebate" program on CO 2 emission and the program cost.
Most publications were concerned with empirical study for the scrappage program. Though some researchers developed analytical models for such a program, our analytical work still signi…cantly di¤ers from them in several aspects.
1. The government's scrappage program under our study involves an MSRP cuto¤ level (in addition to a subsidy). To the best of our knowledge, no existent publication has analytically considered such a cuto¤ level for any scrappage scheme, which is actually important to the program's e¤ectiveness in stimulating the sales because of the following fact. The cuto¤ level could lead consumers to buy qualifying automobiles-i.e., those with MSRPs lower than or equal to the cuto¤ level-and obtain the subsidy from the government. Manufacturers may respond to consumers'purchase behaviors by reducing their wholesale prices and MSRPs to qualify for the scrappage program. Thus, the choice of the cuto¤ level a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program. It behooves us to consider the scrappage program including the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy. This saliently distinguishes our paper from extant publications. 2. The modeling approach in our paper di¤ers from that in any existent publication. None of the publications regarding the government's scrappage program analyzed consumers' trade-in decisions, which is, however, important because the program aims at encouraging consumers to buy qualifying automobiles. In this paper, we consider each consumer's purchase decision by using the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme to compute the retail price that is negotiated by the retailer and the consumer. This di¤ers from most extant publications which (i) ignored consumers' behaviors in their automobile transactions, (ii) allowed the retailer to unilaterally decide on an optimal retail price maximizing the retailer's individual pro…t, and (iii) presumed that consumers in all successful transactions accept the retail price. Moreover, we allow heterogeneity in consumers'valuations, which is important because it enables us to investigate how the scrappage program entices low-valuation consumers to trade in their used automobiles. Thus, compared with relevant publications, the modeling approach in our paper is more realistic. Using our analytical results characterizing consumers'purchase behaviors, we derive a demand function, which is expected to analytically describe automobile sales in an accurate manner. 3. Our realistic model and analysis for the scrappage program that has appeared in real life generate a number of new managerial insights that have not been found in extant publications. For a summary of our new insights, see Section 7.
Preliminaries
We consider a two-level automobile supply chain in the presence of a scrappage program, where a manufacturer produces a fuel-e¢ cient automobile-that meets relevant requirements in the scrappage program-at the unit acquisition cost c. The manufacturer sells its products to a retailer in a market at the wholesale price w.
In practice, an automobile manufacturer usually recommends to its retailers a suggested retail price p s which is commonly calculated as the manufacturer's wholesale price plus a markup percentage ( 0) of the wholesale price-i.e., p s = (1 + )w-as indicated by a large number of facts in the automobile industry, see, e.g., Martí (2000) , Biz.Yahoo.Com (2011), and Leaseguide.com (2011) . Note that some …rms may use the concept of "gross margin" instead of the markup percentage to calculate the MSRP. In fact, the gross margin and the markup percentage uniquely correspond to each other, such that the gross margin is equal to =(1 + ) and the value of can be found as (pro…t margin)/(1 pro…t margin). Therefore, using the markup percentage to determine the MSRP does not result in any loss of generality of our model and analysis.
The above discussion indicates that, in the automobile industry, the MSRP actually re‡ects a markup ceiling that a manufacturer allows its retailer to take; for details, see, e.g., a case report by Martí (2000) . Since the MSRP of the automobile is known to consumers, the actual retail prices are usually not higher than the MSRP, because the retail price charged to a consumer is commonly determined as the result of negotiation between the retailer and the consumer over a discount from the MSRP. Therefore, we can calculate the retail price p r for a consumer as p r = (1 )p s = (1 )(1 + )w, where 2 [0; 1] represents the discount from MSRP p s . Because the retail price is greater than or equal to the wholesale price w, i.e., p r w, we should determine the value of such that (1 )(1 + ) 1, or, =(1 + ). In our paper, the market that the retailer serves has a …nite consumer base B consisting of all potential consumers who may trade in their old automobiles for new ones. Moreover, each consumer in the market only buys one unit of automobile in a transaction. Consumers on the base B may have di¤erent valuations over their used automobiles; they may also draw di¤erent valuations from the new automobile. To re ‡ect the fact, we assume the heterogeneity of consumers'net trade-in valuations. We de…ne a consumer's net trade-in valuation as the consumer's valuation of the new automobile minus his or her valuation of the used automobile. The heterogeneous net valuations of consumers are characterized by a non-negative random parameter with p.d.f. f ( ) and c.d.f. F ( ) on support [0; ], where is the maximum net valuation of all consumers in the market. Let A and s denote the cuto¤ level and subsidy for the scrappage program, respectively. We …nd that each consumer can gain at most + s from trade-in when p s A, or, w A=(1 + ), but can obtain at most when w > A=(1 + ). Thus, to assure the e¤ectiveness of the MSRP p s , the manufacturer should determine its wholesale price such that w p s +
Under this condition, we …nd that if A < w, then the manufacturer certainly cannot qualify for the program; but, if A +1 fw A=(1+ )g s, then the manufacturer can always qualify for the program. Taking the above into account, the government should determine its cuto¤ level
In addition, we assume that the manufacturer's wholesale price is greater than the subsidy s, i.e., w > s. This assumption is consistent with practice. For example, under the U.S. CARS program, the automobile type-dependent subsidy for each quali…ed transaction is $3; 500 or $4; 500, which is signi…cantly lower than most manufacturers'wholesale prices.
Next, we develop a net surplus function for a consumer who possesses a speci…c net tradein valuation . Note that the consumer's net surplus is computed as his or her net trade-in valuation minus the purchase cost [i.e., the retail price p r = (1 )(1 + )w] possibly plus the subsidy s. Since whether or not the consumer can get the subsidy s depends on the comparison between the cuto¤ level A and the MSRP p s (which is dependent on the wholesale price w), we can write the consumer's net surplus function u( ; w) as,
According to the above discussion, we …nd that, given the government's scrappage program (A; s), the manufacturer …rst determines its wholesale price w and releases it to the retailer, who then bargains with each consumer over a retail price. The MSRP p s is visible to all consumers in their price negotiations. Such a decision process is depicted by Figure 1 , where the arrow between the manufacturer and retailer denotes that the wholesale price w is unilaterally determined by the manufacturer, and the double-head arrow between the retailer and a consumer represents that the retail price p is determined as a result of the bargaining between the retailer and the consumer. To help readers easily follow our modeling and analysis, we summarize the notations used in this paper in Table 2 .
Negotiated Retail Price
We investigate the price negotiation between the retailer and a consumer with a speci…c net valuation , who bargain over the discount of the MSRP p s , given the scrappage program (A; s) and the manufacturer's wholesale price w. The bargaining issue is important to our paper mainly because of the following fact. If we do not consider the bargaining issue to …nd the negotiated retail price but determine the optimal retail price by maximizing the retailer's expected pro…t, then there will be a unique retail price for all consumers, which prevents the consumers with low valuations from buying. This results in underestimation of the expected sales and the total carbon emission reduction, because as a result of price negotiation, those low-valuation consumers may purchase automobiles at lower retail prices. That is, ignoring the bargaining issue can undervalue the impact of the government's scrappage program on the sales and the automobile supply chain. Since, in practice, the retailer and each consumer may have di¤erent bargaining powers, we use the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme-developed by Roth (1979) -to …nd the negotiated discount and retail price for the two players. In our bargaining problem, without loss of generality, we assume that the consumer is player 1 with the bargaining power and the retailer is player 2 with the bargaining power 1
. Consumers may possess di¤erent bargaining powers when negotiating with the retailer. To incorporate the heterogeneity of consumers in their bargaining powers, we assume that is a random variable with the p.d.f. We next compute these two players'pro…ts (y 1 ; y 2 ) and security levels (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ). The consumer's net surplus u( ; w) in (1) can be regarded as his or her "pro…t;"that is, y 1 = u( ; w). The retailer's pro…t from the transaction is calculated as its sales revenue (i.e., the retail price p r ) minus wholesale price w that the retailer pays to the manufacturer, that is,
(1 + )]w. Moreover, for our problem, the retailer's and the consumer's security levels (also known as status quo points) are de…ned as these two players' guaranteed pro…ts when they do not complete any transaction. Since neither the retailer nor the consumer will gain any pro…t if no transaction occurs between them, the status quo points are (y 0 1 ; y 0 2 ) = (0; 0) and the set of Pareto optimal solutions is P = f(y 1 ; y 2 )ju( ; w) 0 and [ (1 + )]w 0g. Using the above, we write the GNB model for our bargaining problem as,
(1 )(1 + )w + 1 fw A=(1+ )g s 0 and w (1 + )w 0.
The negotiated retail price obtained from the above Nash bargaining model cannot exceed the MSRP p s . We derive the negotiated discount and retail price as follows.
Theorem 1 If < 1 w 1 fw A=(1+ )g s, then the consumer does not buy any automobile from the retailer. Otherwise, if 1 , then the consumer and the retailer complete the transaction with the following GNB-characterized discount:
where 2 (1+ )w=(1 ) 1 fw A=(1+ )g s, and the retail price charged to the consumer is thus computed as
Proof. For a proof of this theorem and the proofs for all subsequent theorems, see Appendix A.
We learn from the above theorem that only consumers with su¢ ciently large net valuations are willing to trade in their used automobiles for new ones under the scrappage program.
According to Theorem 1, given the wholesale price w, we can calculate the expected retail price for each transaction as follows:
which must be greater than the wholesale price w because w < + 1 fw A=(1+ )g s. We then develop the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected pro…t functions as
Moreover, we can compute the expected sales (i.e., the total number of automobiles that consumers on the base B buy) as
Remark 1 Theorem 1 also indicates consumers' purchase decisions when the government does not implement a scrappage program, which corresponds to the case that s = 0. In the case of no scrappage program, a consumer with < 1 j s=0 = w does not buy from the retailer; but if 1 j s=0 , then the consumer is willing to buy at the following retail price:
Noting that 1 j s=0 > 1 j s>0 when w A=(1 + ), we …nd that the scrappage program can entice more consumers to buy from the retailer.
Manufacturer' s Optimal Wholesale Price
We maximize the manufacturer's expected pro…t M (w) in (5) to …nd its optimal wholesale pricing decision under a given scrappage program (A; s). As Theorem 1 indicates, the value of 1 in (5) depends on the condition that w A=(1 + ). Therefore, in order to …nd the optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer, we need to consider the following two scenarios:
w A=(1 + ) and w > A=(1 + ), and maximize M (w) for each scenario. Then, we compare the maximum pro…ts obtained for the above two scenarios to …nd the manufacturer's globally optimal wholesale price.
Pro…t Maximization under the Constraint that w A=(1 + )
When w A=(1 + ), the manufacturer's optimization problem can be described as,
Lemma 1 If f ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave on [0; ], then the manufacturer's expected pro…t M 1 (w) is a unimodal function of the wholesale price w.
Proof. For our proof, see Appendix B.
The above lemma indicates that the unimodality of function M 1 (w) depends on the condition that f ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave. Such a condition is acceptable, because, as Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) showed, many commonly-used distributions-e.g., uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, Laplace (double exponential), Weibull, Gamma, etc.-satisfy the condition. To that end, we assume that the p.d.f. f ( ) possesses the properties of continuous di¤erentiability and log-concavity.
Theorem 2 Given the scrappage program (A; s), the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w 1 when w A=(1 + ) can be uniquely determined as
whereŵ 1 is a unique solution to the following equation:
Then, we can compute the expected sales as D(w 1 ) = B[1 F (w 1 s)], and calculate the total subsidy cost as C s (s) = sD(w 1 ) = Bs[1 F (w 1 s)]. Using w 1 in (8), we rewrite the manufacturer's expected pro…t as
Corollary 1 The value ofŵ 1 is increasing in the subsidy s, i.e., @ŵ 1 =@s > 0; but the increment inŵ 1 is smaller than that in the subsidy, i.e., @ŵ 1 =@s < 1.
Proof. For a proof of this corollary and that for the next corollary, see Appendix C.
The above corollary shows that, ifŵ 1 A=(1 + ), then increasing the subsidy s leads the manufacturer to raise its wholesale price with an increment lower than the rise in s. Thus, the MSRP p s = (1 + )w is also increasing in the subsidy s.
Theorem 3 Ifŵ 1 A=(1 + ), then the expected sales, and the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected pro…ts are strictly increasing in the subsidy s. In addition, the total subsidy cost is increasing in s.
The above theorem implies that both the manufacturer and the retailer can bene…t from an increase in the subsidy s, when the government chooses a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level such that A
(1 + )ŵ 1 . Though, the government may not need to choose a very large subsidy because, otherwise, it will incur a high "expense" C s (s), which is considered as an "input" for implementing the scrappage program. Recall from Section 1 that some governments (e.g., China, France, Germany, Greece, and Japan) do not involve any cuto¤ level into their scrappage programs, so that each consumer can obtain a subsidy no matter what retail price the manufacturer suggests. That is, for those governments' scrappage programs, the cuto¤ level in our model is set as the maximum value + s. Even though other governments (e.g., Mexico, Slovaks, and the United States) explicitly apply cuto¤ levels to their programs, we …nd that those cuto¤ levels are signi…cantly higher than the suggested prices of qualifying automobiles. For example, the U.S. government's cuto¤ level for its scrappage program is $45; 000, as indicated by Table 1 . According to the report by IHS (2010), which is a leading global source of critical information and insight, the average MSRP for new vehicles under the U.S. scrappage program was $22; 450, which is signi…cantly lower than the cuto¤ level $45; 000.
Pro…t Maximization under the Constraint that w > A=(1 + )
When w > A=(1 + ), all consumers who buy the manufacturer's automobiles cannot obtain the subsidy s, and, 1 = w. Therefore, under the constraint that w > A=(1 + ), the manufacturer maximizes the following expected pro…t:
Theorem 4 Given the scrappage program (A; s), we maximize the manufacturer's expected pro…t M 2 (w) in (10) subject to w > A=(1 + ), and …nd that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w 2 can be uniquely determined as follows:
where " is a positive in…nitesimal, andŵ 2 is a unique solution to the equation
Using w 2 in (11), we can rewrite the manufacturer's expected pro…t function in (10) The above corollary means that, if no cuto¤ level is involved into a scrappage program implemented by, e.g., China, France, Germany, etc., then the resulting wholesale price is greater than that in the absence of the program. That is, the scrappage program may result in an increase in the wholesale price.
The Optimal Wholesale Price
Using our analytic results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we now derive the manufacturer's globally optimal wholesale price maximizing its expected pro…t under no constraint, in the presence of the government's scrappage program (A; s). To do so, we need to compare the manufacturer's maximum pro…t when w A=(1 + ) (the manufacturer quali…es for the scrappage program) and that when w > A=(1 + ) (the manufacturer does not qualify for the program).
Theorem 5 Given the government's program (A; s) for automobile scrappage, the manufacturer's globally optimal wholesale price w can be uniquely determined as follows:
wherew 1 andw 2 are given as
The above theorem suggests that the scrappage program signi…cantly a¤ects the manufacturer's optimal wholesale pricing decision. Speci…cally, if the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w isŵ 1 or A=(1 + ), then the manufacturer can qualify for the program and achieve the expected sales D(w ). As a result, the government needs to spend the total subsidy C s (s) = sD(w ). Otherwise, if the manufacturer does not qualify for the program, then each consumer buying the manufacturer's product cannot obtain any subsidy from the government, which thus incurs no subsidy cost. We next provide a numerical example to illustrate our above analysis.
Example 1 We assume that each consumer's net valuation is normally distributed on the support [0; ] with mean E( ) = $30; 000 and standard deviation = $4; 000. The average value of consumers' net valuations roughly approximates $30; 000 because, as Markiewicz (2012) reported, the average transaction price for new fuel cars in April 2012 is $30; 748. We also note from Jiskha.Com (2010) that, in 2010, the transaction prices of new fuel vehicles roughly followed a normal distribution with mean $23; 000 and standard deviation $3; 500. Accordingly, in this numerical example, it should be reasonable to suppose that the consumers' net consumption gains are normally distributed with E( ) = $30; 000 and = $4; 000.
The maximum net valuation is set as = $60; 000. We truncate the normal distribution function at zero and assume that the probability of negative values is added to that of zero; we also truncate the distribution at = , assuming that the probability of > is added to that of . We learn from Leaseguide.com (2011) that an automobile retailer's pro…t margin is usually between 4% and 13% with an average value falling in range [6%,8%]. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that = 0:07. According to the discussions from Cuenca et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2010) , we assume that the manufacturer's unit production cost is c = $25; 000, and the retailer serves a market with the size B = 1; 000; 000. In addition, as indicated by Chen et al. (2008) , it is reasonable to assume that the retailer's bargaining power follows a normal distribution with mean 0:4 and standard deviation 0:1.
Suppose that the scrappage program involves the MSRP cuto¤ level A = $35; 000 and the subsidy s = $4; 000. The manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price as w = w 1 = $32; 297:56. As a result, the MSRP is p s = (1 + )w = $34; 558:39, which is less than the cuto¤ level A. Thus, the manufacturer quali…es for the scrappage program. We can also …nd the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected pro…ts as M (w ) = $4:85 10 9 and retailer's expected pro…ts are determined as M (w ) = $2:50 10 9 and R (w ) = $1:06 10 9 , respectively. Because no consumer can obtain the subsidy, the government's total subsidy cost is zero. From the above three scenarios, we observe that the manufacturer's expected pro…t when A = $35; 000 is signi…cantly larger than those when A = $28; 000 and A = $32; 000. This means that increasing the MSRP cuto¤ level may increase the manufacturer's expected pro…t. However, the sales when A = $35; 000 are greater than those when A = $28; 000 but less than those when A = $32; 000.
Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Implications
In this section, we perform analytical and numerical sensitivity analysis to explore the impact of the MSRP cuto¤ level A, the subsidy s, and the MSRP markup percentage on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and the manufacturer's and the retailer's maximum expected pro…ts. Moreover, we …nd the government's optimal cuto¤ level and subsidy decisions that maximize the expected sales.
The Scrappage Programs
We …rst investigate the impact of A and s, and then derive the government's optimal decisions.
The Impact of the MSRP Cuto¤ Level A
We learn from Theorem 5 that if A is su¢ ciently low, then the manufacturer may be unwilling to reduce its wholesale price and MSRP to qualify for the scrappage program. This occurs possibly because qualifying for the program with a low cuto¤ level may deteriorate the manufacturer's pro…t margin. As a result, all consumers who buy the manufacturer's automobiles cannot get the subsidy, which means that the scrappage program is ine¤ective in increasing the sales and reducing air pollution. Therefore, it is important to execute a proper trade-in scheme for the automobile scrappage. Next, we analytically derive the minimum MSRP cuto¤ level that induces the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program.
Theorem 6 Given a subsidy s, the minimum MSRP cuto¤ levelÃ(s) for the manufacturer to willingly qualify for the scrappage program is obtained as follows: 1. If (1 + )ŵ 2 , thenÃ(s) is the unique solution that satis…es M 1 (A=(1 + )) = M 2 (ŵ 2 ). 2. If (1 + )ŵ 2 > , thenÃ(s) is the unique solution that satis…es M 1 (A=(1 + )) = M 2 ( =(1 + )). The minimum cuto¤ levelÃ(s) is decreasing in the subsidy s.
If A Ã (s), the manufacturer determines a wholesale price such that the MSRP is lower than or equal to the cuto¤ level A and thus quali…es for the scrappage program. Otherwise, the manufacturer does not qualify for the program. Next, using the parameter values in Example 1 but increasing A from $24; 000 to $38; 000 in increments of $1; 000, we plot Figure  2 to show the e¤ect of the cuto¤ level A on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w [in Figure 2 Figure 2 indicates that if A is less thanÃ(s) (Zone 1), then the manufacturer has no intention to qualify for the scrappage program; but if A is greater thañ A(s) (Zone 2), then the manufacturer decides to qualify for the program.
Figure 2: The impact of the cuto¤ level A on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w , the expected sales D(w ), the manufacturer's expected pro…t M (w ), and the retailer's expected pro…t R (w ). Note that, in Zone 1 (where A < A(s)), the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify for the scrappage program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where A A(s)), w A=(1 + ) and the manufacturer quali…es for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
When A is in Zone 1, the manufacturer determines its wholesale price asŵ 2 = $30; 006:63 and is unwilling to qualify for the scrappage program. This happens because of the following fact: If the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price, then more consumers are willing to buy and the expected sales are increased. But, when the cuto¤ level A is small, reducing the wholesale price to satisfy (1 + )w A-i.e., to qualify for the scrappage programwill greatly decrease the manufacturer's pro…t margin but may not signi…cantly increase the expected sales. As a result, when A is in Zone 1, the manufacturer is worse o¤ from reducing its wholesale price, thereby keeping the wholesale price asŵ 2 , which is independent of the cuto¤ level A. Therefore, we observe that in Figure 2 , when A <Ã(s), the curves of the optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts are horizontal lines.
When A is increased from a value in Zone 1 (where A <Ã(s)) to A =Ã(s) (which belongs to Zone 2), the manufacturer can enjoy a higher pro…t by reducing its wholesale price to A=(1 + ) and thus qualifying for the scrappage program. The manufacturer's price reduction across two zones appears to be a downward jump in Figure 2(a) . Moreover, such a price reduction generates a signi…cant increase in the expected sales [i.e., an upward jump in Figure 2(b) ], which causes an increase in the retailer's expected pro…t [i. e., an upward jump in Figure 2(d) ]. However, there is no jump in the manufacturer's expected pro…t at the boundary between two zones, as indicated in Figure 2(c) . This happens because, as Theorem 6 shows, at the boundary (i.e., A =Ã(s)), the manufacturer is indi¤erent between qualifying and not qualifying for the program.
We learn from Theorem 5 that whenÃ(s) A < (1 + )ŵ 1 = $34; 558:39, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is w = A=(1 + ), which is increasing in A, as shown in Figure  2(a) . Hence, the expected sales, D(w ) = 1 F (A=(1+ ) s), are decreasing in A; see Figure  2 (b). Such a result follows the fact that if the cuto¤ level is higher than the minimum level (for the manufacturer's program quali…cation) but lower than a su¢ ciently large value (that does not in ‡uence the manufacturer's wholesale pricing decision), then the manufacturer intends to raise its wholesale price to attain a higher expected pro…t while qualifying for the scrappage program. Though, an increase in the wholesale price does not signi…cantly reduce the expected sales, as indicated by Figure 2(b) , because the government's subsidy s awarded to each consumer helps alleviate the negative impact of the price increase on the sales.
As discussed above, whenÃ(s) A < (1 + )ŵ 1 , the manufacturer's expected pro…t, is decreasing in A, which is attributed to the following fact. An increase in A leads to a reduction in the expected sales but does not signi…cantly raise the retail price to increase the retailer's pro…t margin, because the retail price results from the negotiation between the retailer and each consumer.
When A (1+ )ŵ 1 , we …nd from Theorems 3 and 5 that the manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price asŵ 1 = $32; 297:56, and the optimal sales are D(w ) = 1 F (ŵ 1 s). Accordingly, any further increase in A has no impact on the optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts. The reason is given as follows: if the manufacturer further increases its wholesale price, then the subsidy for a consumer cannot help reduce the consumer's purchase cost and the sales are thus signi…cantly reduced. Therefore, the manufacturer does not change its wholesale price; and the expected sales, and the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected pro…ts are unchanged. The corresponding curves in Figure 2 are thus horizontal lines.
The e¤ect of A on the expected sales in Zone 2 also implies that, compared with a scrappage program with a subsidy only (i.e., the MSRP cuto¤ level A is in…nitely large), a program with a moderate value of the cuto¤ level is more e¤ective in reducing the wholesale price and thus boosting the sales of fuel e¢ cient automobiles. For example, comparing the expected sales when A =Ã(s) with those when A = (1 + )ŵ 1 in our numerical experiments, we …nd that a scrappage program with the MSRP cuto¤ levelÃ(s) can e¤ectively improve the expected sales by 21:3% than a program without a cuto¤ level.
The manufacturer's pro…t reaches its maximum value when A (1 + )ŵ 1 . Any further increase in A cannot improve its pro…t any more. This means that the manufacturer's expectation on the value of the cuto¤ level signi…cantly di¤ers from the government's optimal cuto¤ level that maximizes the expected sales. Since the scrappage program is implemented mainly to control carbon emissions and protect the environment, we next discuss the impact of the sales of the fuel e¢ cient automobile on the reduction in CO 2 emissions. According to Sachs (2009) and Zolnik (2012) , we can roughly estimate the reduction in CO 2 emissions when more consumers trade in their used automobiles for new, more fuel-e¢ cient automobiles. Speci…-cally, new fuel-e¢ cient automobiles can run 24:9 miles per gallon (mpg) on average, whereas the average mpg for trade-in automobiles is 15:8. This means that the average di¤erence in fuel e¢ ciency between new and used automobiles is 9:1 mpg. Assuming that an automobile can run for 12; 000 miles per year, we …nd that the new and used automobiles need 482 and 759 gallons of gasoline, respectively. That is, such a trade-in can reduce the gasoline usage by 277 gallons. Because around 8:8 kilograms of CO 2 is generated by burning one gallon of gasoline, the trade-in can decrease CO 2 emissions by 2:44 metric tons.
When A =Ã(s), the expected sales increase to the maximum level of 713; 973, the reduction in the gasoline consumption approximates 19:78 million gallons, and the corresponding reduction in CO 2 emissions is calculated as 1:74 million metric tons. But, when A (1+ )ŵ 1 , the expected sales decrease to 634; 803 and thus, the reduction in the gasoline consumption and that in CO 2 emissions are 17:65 million gallons and 1:55 million metric tons, respectively. As the above results indicate, the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program in reducing CO 2 emissions is dependent on the sales of the fuel-e¢ cient automobile. As Figure 2 (a) suggests, the government should adopt a moderate cuto¤ level (e.g., A =Ã(s)) rather than implementing a high cuto¤ level A >Ã(s), in order to e¤ectively increase the sales of new automobiles.
When the government does not implement any scrappage program (s = 0), the consumer's purchase decision is given as in Remark 1, and the manufacturer determines the wholesale price asŵ 2 . The resulting expected sales are D(ŵ 2 ) = 1 F (ŵ 2 ), and the manufacturer's expected pro…t is (ŵ 2 ). As indicated by Figure 2(b) , D(ŵ 2 ) (the expected sales in Zone 1) is much lower than the expected sales when the manufacturer quali…es for the program (in Zone 2), which are D(A=(1 + )) whenÃ(s) A < (1 + )ŵ 1 and D(ŵ 1 ) when A (1 + )ŵ 1 . This suggests that a scrappage program with a su¢ ciently large MSRP cuto¤ level A can signi…cantly increase the sales of new fuel-e¢ cient automobiles.
The Impact of the Subsidy s
Using Theorem 5, we can investigate the impact of subsidy s on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and maximum expected pro…t, and the expected sales. Speci…cally, if A (1+ )ŵ 1 , then the manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price asŵ 1 , and its maximum expected pro…t and the expected sales are increasing in s, according to Theorem 3. If (1 + )ŵ 2 A < (1 + )ŵ 1 , then the manufacturer decides to qualify for the scrappage program and determines its optimal wholesale price as A=(1+ ), which is independent of the subsidy s. However, the expected sales D(A=(1+ )) and the manufacturer's expected pro…t M 1 (A=(1+ )) are both increasing in s. If A < (1 + )ŵ 2 , then the manufacturer may or may not desire to qualify for the scrappage program. When M 1 (A=(1 + )) M 2 (ŵ 2 ), the manufacturer chooses to qualify for the scrappage program by setting its optimal wholesale price as A=(1+ ). Since M 1 (A=(1 + )) is increasing in the subsidy s, we …nd that if the government increases its subsidy s to a su¢ ciently high level, then the manufacturer certainly has an incentive to qualify for the scrappage program and obtain a greater pro…t. A critical question then arises as follows: What is the minimum subsidy assuring that the manufacturer chooses to qualify for the scrappage program?
Theorem 7 Given an MSRP cuto¤ level A, the minimum subsidys(A) that leads the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program can be given as follows:
Recall from Theorem 5 that the manufacturer always decides to qualify for the scrappage program when A ŵ 2 (1+ ). We learn from Theorem 7 that, when A <ŵ 2 (1+ ), the subsidy s should be greater than or equal tos(A), so as to assure that the manufacturer decides to qualify for the program. Accordingly, if both the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy are su¢ ciently low, then the scrappage program may be ine¤ective, because the manufacturer is unwilling to reduce its wholesale price and MSRP to qualify for the program. It follows that a government's scrappage program with a su¢ ciently high value of A [e.g., A ŵ 2 (1 + )] is likely to be e¤ective even if the subsidy s is not large. This result is in agreement with the practice that some governments (e.g., Mexico, Slovaks, and the United States) implement a signi…cantly high cuto¤ level, and other governments (e.g., China, France, Germany, and Japan) do not set any cuto¤ level. Moreover, another important reason why the governments are willing to increase the cuto¤ level rather than the subsidy is that awarding a large subsidy to consumers may bring a heavy …nancial burden to the governments.
However, even if the cuto¤ level A is so high that the manufacturer decides to qualify for the scrappage program, the expected sales and the manufacturer's expected pro…t cannot be signi…cantly improved when the subsidy is very low. According to Theorem 3, we …nd that when A Ã (s), both the manufacturer's expected pro…t and the expected sales are increasing in s. This means that, keeping A unchanged, the government can raise its subsidy to increase the manufacturer's expected pro…t and the expected sales, which can entice the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program. In fact, we …nd from Theorem 6 thatÃ(s) is decreasing in s, which implies that, to encourage the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program, the government should increase s to a su¢ ciently high levelŝ such that A Ã (ŝ). Since a very large subsidy may cause a heavy …nancial burden, the government should determine a proper value of subsidy subject to its budget constraint. This can be demonstrated by the practice in China: In June 2009, a nationwide scrappage program was implemented to o¤er subsidies of RMB3,000-RMB6,000 (equivalently, US$450-US$900) to consumers who trade in used heavy polluting automobiles or trucks for new ones. However, this program could only result in a little success in the …rst several months; hence, the Chinese government raised its subsidy to RMB5,000-RMB18,000 (equivalently, US$750-US$2,700). The new scrappage program was proved to be e¤ective, because, until October 2010, the number of replaced automobiles had been 2:84 10 5 .
Figure 3: The impact of the subsidy s on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w , the expected sales D(w ), the manufacturer's expected pro…t M (w ), and the retailer's expected pro…t R (w ). Note that, in Zone 1 (where s <s(A)), the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify for the scrappage program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where s s(A)), w A=(1 + ) and the manufacturer quali…es for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
We now perform numerical experiments to examine the e¤ect of subsidy s on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w , expected sales D(w ), and the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts M (w ) and R (w ), assuming A = $30; 000 but using the values of other parameters as in Example 1. We increase the value of s from $3; 600 to $4; 400 in increments of $100, and plot Figures 3(a)-(d) to show the impact of s on w , D(w ), M (w ), and R (w ). We …nd thats(A) = $3; 835:98.
When s is small such that s <s(A) (Zone 1), the manufacturer determines its wholesale price asŵ 2 and does not qualify for the scrappage program. As a result, consumers cannot obtain the subsidy from the government, and the expected sales D(ŵ 2 ) are thus low, as shown in Figure 3(b) ; the government's total subsidy cost is zero. It follows that the optimal wholesale priceŵ 2 , the expected sales D(ŵ 2 ), the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts are independent of s; therefore, all the corresponding curves are horizontal lines in Zone 1, as indicated by Figure 3 .
When s is increased from s <s(A) (Zone 1) to s s(A) (Zone 2), the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to A=(1+ ) in order to qualify for the program, and each consumer can enjoy the subsidy. This generates a large increase in the expected sales, and the retailer enjoys a great increase in its expected pro…t. Therefore, we observe jumps at the boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figures 3(a), (b) , and (d). We note from Theorem 7 that at s =s(A), the manufacturer is indi¤erent in his expected pro…t between qualifying and not qualifying for the program; hence, we do not observe a jump in the manufacturer's pro…t at the boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figure 3(c) .
In Zone 2, the expected sales are D(A=(1 + )) = 1 F (A=(1 + ) s), and the government's total subsidy cost is C s (s) = s[1 F (A=(1 + ) s)]. As s increases, the manufacturer has no incentive to reduce its wholesale price because the manufacturer intends to assure its pro…t margin while each consumer enjoys a greater net gain. In addition, when the government increases s, the manufacturer does not increase its wholesale price because, otherwise, the manufacturer will not qualify for the program. Therefore, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is independent of s when s s(Ã), as indicated by Figure 3(a) . As a result, increasing the value of s can entice more low-valuation consumers to trade in their used automobiles, which implies that the expected sales are increasing in s; see Figure 3 (b) . Since the manufacturer's pro…t margin is not reduced (as argued above), its expected pro…t is increasing in s, as shown in Figure 3(c) . In addition, a higher subsidy helps raise the retail price and thus improve the retailer's pro…t margin. It follows that the retailer's expected pro…t increases as the value of s rises, as depicted in Figure 3(d) .
From the above, we …nd that even when the government sets a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level A, the subsidy is still helpful to increase the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles for reducing CO 2 emissions and to raise the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected pro…ts for assuring the two …rms' incentives. However, we note from Figures 2 and 3 that when s s(A), increasing s does not signi…cantly raise the sales and two …rms'expected pro…ts, compared with the impact of A. In fact, a larger subsidy bene…ts the high-valuation consumers but is not signi…cantly e¤ective in attracting low-valuation consumers to buy. Therefore, the government incurs a high subsidy cost without saliently improving the sales. This suggests that the government needs to implement an appropriate MSRP cuto¤ level but may not need to apply a very large subsidy.
We also learn from Figure 3(b) that the expected sales D(ŵ 2 ) when the government does not implement any program are signi…cantly lower than the expected sales D(w ) in the presence of an e¤ective scrappage program (i.e., s s(A)). This implies that when the subsidy is su¢ ciently large, the scrappage program can signi…cantly stimulate more consumers to buy fuel-e¢ cient automobiles.
The Government' s Optimal Decisions
In practice, the government usually has a budget (denoted by C s ) for its scrappage program. For example, the budget for the US government's "CARS"scrappage program was $3:0 billion, and the German government a¤orded its scrappage program with a total amount of about $7 billion (e5 billion); see Aldred and Tepe (2011) and Lenski et al. (2010) . It thus behooves us to consider the following important question. Given a budget for the government's scrappage program, what are the government's optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales?
We recall from Section 6.1.1 that given a subsidy s, in order to maximize the sales, the government should set the MSRP cuto¤ level at A =Ã(s), and the manufacturer determines its wholesale price as w =Ã(s)=(1 + ). The corresponding expected sales are D(Ã(s)) = 1 F (Ã(s)=(1 + ) s). The scrappage program include both an MSRP cuto¤ level and a subsidy. Thus, besides the cuto¤ level, the government should also determine the optimal subsidy for the given budget C s . In order to e¤ectively improve the sales, the total subsidy cost-i.e., C s = s D(Ã(s))-should be equal to C s ; that is,
As Theorem 6 indicates thatÃ(s) is decreasing in s, and the expected sales D(Ã(s)) is increasing in s. The total subsidy cost C s (s) = s D(Ã(s)) is a monotone function. Consequently, equation (12) has a unique optimal solution s .
Remark 2 In order to maximize the expected sales, the government should determine its optimal MSRP cuto¤ level as A =Ã(s), and choose its optimal subsidy as s = fsjs
Next, using the parameter values in Example 1 but increasing the budget C s from $1:5 10 We also observe from Figures 4(a) and (b) that the optimal subsidy is increasing in the government's budget C s , whereas the optimal MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in C s . This result may be surprising because the government could respond to a higher budget by decreasing its cuto¤ level to encourage the manufacturer to reduce its wholesale price-see Figure 4 (d)-and qualify for the program, thus improving sales. We also observe from Figure  4 (c) that the expected sales are increasing in C s but at a decreasing rate, which implies that a large budget may not help the scrappage program saliently increase the sales.
The Impact of the MSRP Markup Percentage
As discussed in Section 3, the MSRP p s is calculated as a percentage markup of the wholesale price w, i.e., p s = (1 + )w, where is the markup percentage. Such an approach for the calculation of MSRP has been widely used in the real-world automobile industry. Using Theorem 5, we can …nd that, given the scrappage program (A; s), if is su¢ ciently small such that A=(1+ ) ŵ 1 , then the manufacturer determines its wholesale price asŵ 1 (which is independent of ) and quali…es for the scrappage program, achieving the pro…t M 1 (ŵ 1 ). As a result, the expected sales are D(ŵ 1 ) = 1 F (ŵ 1 s). If is given such thatŵ 2 A=(1 + ) < w 1 , then the manufacturer still decides to qualify for the scrappage program, determining its wholesale price as A=(1 + ). The resulting expected sales are D(w ) = 1 F (A=(1 + ) s) , and the manufacturer's expected pro…t is M 1 (A=(1 + )). Note that M 1 (A=(1 + )) is lower than M 1 (ŵ 1 ).
If the markup percentage is given such that A=(1 + ) <ŵ 2 =(1 + ), then the manufacturer may or may not decide to qualify for the scrappage program. Speci…cally, when ~ , where~ is the unique solution to the equation that M 1 (A=(1 + )) = M 2 (ŵ 2 ), the manufacturer will choose the optimal wholesale price as A=(1 + ) to qualify for the program. But, when >~ , the manufacturer will not qualify for the program. We also …nd that the manufacturer's expected pro…t when A=(1 + ) <ŵ 2 =(1 + ) is larger than that when A=(1 + ) =(1 + ) <ŵ 2 . From the above, we conclude that the markup percentage greatly in ‡uences the manufacturer's decision on whether or not to qualify for the scrappage program. That is, the manufacturer with a larger value of has less incentive to qualify for the program, which means that the program is less likely to be e¤ective. Figure 5 : The impact of the markup percentage on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w , the expected sales D(w ), the manufacturer's expected pro…t M (w ), and the retailer's expected pro…t R (w ). Note that, in Zone 1 (where ~ ), the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify for the scrappage program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where <~ ), w A=(1+ ), and the manufacturer quali…es for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
To demonstrate our above results, we use the parameter values as in Example 1 but increase from 0:03 to 0:12 in increments of 0:01, and plot Figure 5 to show the impact of on the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and two …rms'expected pro…ts. When falls in Zone 2 (i.e., ~ ), the manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price as A=(1+ ), so as to qualify for the scrappage program. Accordingly, each consumer can enjoy a subsidy from the government. Moreover, the wholesale price A=(1 + ) is decreasing in ; thus, a larger value of results in higher expected sales, as shown in Figure 5(b) . As a consequence, the retailer bene…ts from a larger value of by achieving higher expected sales and a higher pro…t margin, as indicated by Figure 5(d) . But, the manufacturer is worse o¤, because the manufacturer's pro…t margin is greatly reduced due to a decrease in its wholesale price, as shown in Figure 5 (c). The expected sales are D(w ) = 1 F (A=(1 + ) s), and the government's total subsidy cost is C s (s) = sD(A=(1 + )), which are both increasing in .
We also learn from Figure 5 (a) that, when the value of is increased from ~ (Zone 2) to >~ (Zone 1), the manufacturer loses its incentive to qualify for the scrappage program, because the manufacturer needs to determine a signi…cantly low wholesale price to qualify for the program. To assure the pro…t margin, the manufacturer keeps its wholesale price at a high level asŵ 2 . As a result, no consumer enjoys a subsidy from the government, which entails a large decrease in the number of consumers trading in their used automobiles. The decrease in the expected sales generates a large decrease in the retailer's expected pro…t. Therefore, there appear the jumps at the boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figures 5(a), (b) , and (d). Moreover, the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts in Zone 1 are lower than those in Zone 2, as shown in Figures 5(c) and (d). Moreover, Figure 5 (d) indicates that the retailer's pro…t reaches its maximum value when =~ . In Zone 1, the optimal wholesale priceŵ 2 is independent of , and thus the expected sales and the manufacturer's expected pro…t do not depend on , which are represented by the horizontal lines in Figures 5(a) , (b), and (c). However, the retailer's pro…t is increasing in because an increase in generates a higher value of the MSRP and then increases the retailer's pro…t margin that is dependent on the MSRP.
From the above, we conclude that even when the government chooses a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level A (as discussed in Section 6.1.1) and a proper subsidy s (as discussed in Section 6.1.2), the manufacturer may not bene…t from the scrappage program, because, for the case of a large MSRP markup percentage , the manufacturer does not intend to reduce the wholesale price to qualify for the scrappage program.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered a two-level automobile supply chain, where a manufacturer and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers in a fuel-e¢ cient automobile market under a government's scrappage program involving a cuto¤ level and a subsidy. We examined the impact of the program on the government's optimal decisions, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the negotiated retail price, and consumers' purchase decisions. Since the retail price charged to a consumer is determined as a result of the negotiation between the consumer and the retailer, who may have di¤erent bargaining powers, we used the GNB concept to characterize the negotiated retail price. We then developed the manufacturer's expected pro…t function, which was maximized to …nd the optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer. In addition, we compared the optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts under the scrappage program and those in the absence of such a program. We also investigated the impact of the MSRP cuto¤ level, the subsidy, the government's budget, and the markup percentage (that was used to calculate the MSRP) on the manufacturer's optimal pricing decision, the expected sales, the manufacturer's and retailer's expected pro…ts, and the government's optimal decisions.
We summarize our major managerial insights as follows: 1. Given a subsidy s, there exists a minimum cuto¤ levelÃ(s) for the manufacturer to qualify for the program, which is decreasing in s. When the cuto¤ level A is increased from a value lower thanÃ(s) to a value higher thanÃ(s), the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is decreased, whereas both the expected sales and the manufacturer's expected pro…t are increased. If A is su¢ ciently large such that A (1+ )ŵ 1 Ã (s), then the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and the expected sales are independent of A but increasing in s; as a result, both the manufacturer and the retailer can bene…t from the scrappage program. If (1 + )ŵ 1 A Ã (s), then the optimal wholesale price and the manufacturer's pro…t are increasing in A, but the expected sales and the retailer's expected pro…t are decreasing in A. When A is equal toÃ(s), the expected sales reach the maximum value and the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program is thus maximized. 2. The manufacturer may not prefer a moderate MSRP cuto¤ level (i.e., A =Ã(s)), because its expected pro…t is the highest when the cuto¤ level takes a su¢ ciently high value (i.e., A (1+ )ŵ 1 ). This means that the manufacturer's preferred cuto¤ level signi…cantly di¤ers from the government's optimal cuto¤ level that maximizes the expected sales. Therefore, the government's optimal decision may in ‡uence the manufacturer's motivation for qualifying for the scrappage program. 3. Given a cuto¤ level A, if s s(A), then the manufacturer desires to qualify for the scrappage program, and the expected sales and the manufacturer's and the retailer's pro…ts are increasing in s. That is, the e¤ectiveness of a scrappage program requires that the subsidy should be su¢ ciently high such that s s(A). Any increase in the subsidy in the range [0;s(A)] cannot help increase the sales. Although a larger subsidy when s s(A) can result in higher sales, it also increases the government's cost. Thus, the optimal subsidy should be determined according to the target sales that the government expects the manufacturer to achieve. 4. Given the government's sales target, we can uniquely compute the optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy, and …nd the corresponding budget for the government. The government's optimal subsidy is increasing in the government's budget, while its optimal MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in the budget. This may be a surprising insight because the government could respond to a higher budget by raising its cuto¤ level to encourage the manufacturer to qualify for the program and thus improving sales. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the budget but at a decreasing rate, which implies that a larger budget may not help the scrappage program saliently increase the sales. 5. Given a scrappage program, there exists a maximum markup percentage~ for the manufacturer to qualify for the program. Moreover, when ~ , the manufacturer's expected pro…t is decreasing in , while the expected sales and the retailer's pro…t are increasing in . The manufacturer with a smaller markup percentage is more likely to reduce its wholesale price and qualify for the scrappage program. The insight is important since the government needs to understand which manufacturers are more likely to qualify for its scrappage program. In conclusion, we …nd that the scrappage program with a su¢ ciently large MSRP cuto¤ level and a proper subsidy is useful to stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles, and also increasing the pro…tability of the automobile manufacturer, who thus has an incentive to qualify for the program. Moreover, for the scrappage program, the government's optimal cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales depend on the budget for such a program.
In future, some research directions may be worth considering. First, we may investigate the scrappage program in a dynamic, temporal setting, focusing on its impact on the manufacturer's future pricing decisions, its long-run average pro…t, and the expected sales. Secondly, it could be important for the manufacturer to consider the investment in its product design. Since the government implements a program to encourage the use of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles, we may need to investigate if and how the program can induce the manufacturer to invest in designing a green automobile for environment protection. Thirdly, in practice a consumer may be willing to sell his or her used automobile in a secondary market instead of trading it in. In another research direction, we may consider the supply chain when a government's scrappage program and a secondary market jointly exist, and examine if and how the existence of the secondary market impacts the manufacturer's decisions and the e¤ectiveness of the government's scrappage program in stimulating consumers'trade-ins. and the retailer's objective functions, and obtain u( ; w) = ( +1 fw A=(1+ )g s w) and w (1+ )w = (1 )( +1 fw A=(1+ )g s w), which must be nonnegative when 2. When 2 < , = 0, and the negotiated retail price is p r (wj ) = p s = (1 + )w.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we ignore the constraint that c < w A=(1 + ). As Lemma 1 indicates, the manufacturer's expected pro…t M 1 (w) is a log-concave function of wholesale price w with a unique optimal solution asŵ 1 . Next, we determine the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price under the constraint that c < w A=(1 + ). There exists two possible scenarios:
1. Ifŵ 1 A=(1 + ), then the optimal wholesale price is w 1 =ŵ 1 . 2. Ifŵ 1 > A=(1 + ), then the optimal wholesale price is w 1 = A=(1 + ), since pro…t function M 1 (w) is a log-concave function of wholesale price w, and thus it is increasing in w when w <ŵ 1 . This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove this theorem, we need to consider the following three steps:
1. The sales realized by the retailer are calculated as D(ŵ 1 ) = B[1 F (ŵ 1 s)], which is only dependent on subsidy s. Recall from Corollary 1 that 0 < @ŵ 1 =@s < 1. We thus obtain that, @D(ŵ 1 )=@s = Bf (ŵ 1 s)(1 @ŵ 1 =@s) > 0, which means that sales D(ŵ 1 ) are strictly increasing in s. 
